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Abstract
On May 1st 2004, Poland entered the European Union (EU), introducing new
variables into the domestic politics of the Polish Republic. Since gaining its
independence from Soviet control in 1989, Poland’s political landscape can be described
as a dynamic and ever changing force towards democratic maturation. With the accession
of Poland to the EU, questions of European integration and Europeanization have arisen,
most specifically with how these two processes effect and shape the behaviors of
domestic political actors.
With Poland entering its second decade of EU membership, this study attempts to
explain how, and if, further European integration has had any effect on the
Europeanization of political parties in Poland. Building upon the work of various
scholars, most notably Aleks Szczerbiak, this study examines the years 2009-2014, and
the examines Poland’s political parties through Robert Ladrech’s framework of
Europeanization.
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Introduction
On May 1st, 2014, The Republic of Poland celebrated its tenth anniversary as a
member of the European Union (EU). The accession of Poland to the EU ended a fifteenyear effort of membership aspirations and signaled another transformative change to
Poland’s political system. Poland’s accession to the EU can be seen as the culmination of
a transitional political effort decades in the making. Throughout the 1970s and 80s, Poles
took the streets in protest and civil unrest aimed at resisting the communist Polish United
Workers’ Party (PZPR). The unrest led to the introduction of martial law from 19811983. In 1989, the communist government of Poland sat down with leaders of the
Solidarity Movement which led to the Round Table Agreement, ushering in the first open
and free elections in Poland since before World War II, culminating in Poland’s
independence from the USSR and the creation of the modern Republic of Poland in
December of 1990. In the 25 years since Poland become a democratic republic, Poland’s
political and party system has been of dynamic transformation, as the republic matured
into a democracy. EU membership has been just another facet of that transformation.
The purpose of this study is to see what, if any, effects EU membership has on
political party systems in member states. Specifically, this study will look at how further
integration with the EU has effected political parties in Poland. This study will examine
political parties in Poland from 2009 to 2014, and build upon the work of various
scholars. The aim is to see whether so called “Europeanization” exists, what its effects on
political party behavior are, and whether EU membership is a new political cleavage in
Poland. Chapter 1 examines the theoretical issues and a framework of what political
1

parties are, and explains Poland’s political and party system. Chapter 2 examines the
issues of European Integration and Europeanization, specifically, outlining what EU
integration is and attempting to define the phenomenon of ‘Europeanization’. Chapter 2
also discusses previous research on the Europeanization of political parties in Europe and
Poland in the first five years of EU membership. Finally, Chapter 3 will examine Polish
party behavior between 2009 and 2014, and examine if there has been a Europeanization
effect on the parties.
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Chapter 1- Political Parties
The following chapter will look at the theoretical underpinnings of what a
political party is and attempt to find a definition of political parties to use as a guide for
this study. The second part of the chapter will examine the dynamic changes that created
the political and party system in Poland since the end of communist rule in 1989.
Defining Political Parties
Explaining what a political party is with one specific definition is not an easy
task. Attempts to define what a political party is, have been an elusive puzzle for political
science scholars. As Henry Steele Commager wrote, “It is easier to say what a party is
not than to say what it is” (Commager 1950, 309). The study of political parties has come
from a multitude of scholars. The sheer breadth of political party study has evolved over
the many decades of scholarship, changing to better reflect the true meaning of a political
party and its functions.
The study of political parties is a corner stone topic of political science research.
Early scholars of political parties struggled to define what they were and what their true
functions were. Robert Michels, writing about his experiences with the Social
Democratic Party of Germany, famously wrote, “who says organization, says oligarchy”,
finding an incompatibility of democracy with large scale social organizations (Michels
1949, 32). Michels viewed political parties as oligarchical associations, which inherently
would lead the party to be a reflection not of its constituents, but of the bureaucratic elites
in charge of the party. Anthony Downs and Leon Epstein similarly studied political
3

parties, focusing attention on parties as being teams seeking control of the governing
apparatus. Downs wrote that the primary concern of party members is to be elected.
Downs stated that parties formulated policies to win elections, rather than winning
elections to formulate policies. (Downs 1957, 25-28). “The party which runs [the]
government manipulates its policies and actions in whatever way it believes will gain it
the most votes without violating constitutional rules” (Downs 1957, 30-31). Leon Epstein
studied parties not from their structural development, but from their functions. Epstein
stated that parties developed primarily on a basis of electoral function. Similar to Downs,
Epstein concluded that a party’s function was to elect government office holders under a
specific label (Epstein 1967).
Downs and Epstein can be categorized as being part of the competing teams
conception to the study of political parties. In their view, electoral victory is the key to
understanding political parties. This conception of political parties is one of many that
encompass the overall study of political parties. JP Monroe explained the study of
political parties as falling into two broad categories. The first, “conceptualizes the party
as an organized expression of citizens to alter the balance of power in the formal
institutions of government” while in the second approach, “the party is an institution
through which elites coordinate their activity as they attempt to satisfy the interests of
their supporters” (Monroe 2001, 16-17). From these two approaches, Monroe identified
the two main conceptions of political parties that have arisen through time. The
competing teams conception, as illustrated by Downs and Epstein, begins any definition
of a political party within the premise that parties are distinguished by their capacity to
contest and win elections. In addition to Downs and Epstein, scholars such as Edward
4

Sait, Austin Ranney, and E.E. Shattshneider fall into this approach of political party
study. These authors identified electoral struggle and the competition between parties as
the paramount of function and motivation of parties (Monroe 2001, 19-21).
The organizational conception attempts to define parties by how they are
organized. Michels earlier mentioned work, was an early example of an organizational
definition of political parties. One of the most important contributions to the study of
parties came from Maurice Duverger, who was the first to develop the idea that a political
party “is a community with a particular structure” (1954, xv). Within this conception,
parties are defined by their organization and structures, that without these attributes they
would cease to be parties at all. The organizational conception of parties is perhaps the
most varied and expansive approach to defining parties. Numerous scholars, from
Michels to Duverger, to Samuel Eldersveld, have broadened this approach to studying
political parties. The organization of structures, from the interaction of party elites,
members, and voters, to the leadership structure of the parties, views the party as an
institution with structure that guides its actions and the actions of its participants (Monroe
2001, 21-29).
The two conceptions of political parties as defined by Monroe might have their
critics. However, they do highlight important features of political parties. The competing
teams conception highlights the central feature of parties; “they are the only groups that
contest elections…whatever else parties do, they do as a consequence of the electoral
requirement” (Monroe 2001, 21). The importance of the organizational concept of
political parties is that it gives a clearer meaning to what a political party actually is.
“Party organization is the institutional consequence of the deliberate coordination of
5

activity to win public office in the party’s name. Party organization is an institution
organized to capture public office” (Monroe 2001, 17). The dual conceptions of
organization and competition, allow for a clear definition of political parties.

Samuel J. Eldersveld’s work in party politics and behavior combined the two
conceptions outlined by Monroe. Eldersveld built upon the ideas and definitions of those
scholars that came before him to thoroughly define political parties. Eldersveld did not
conceptualize parties solely on the basis of electoral competition. Nor did he see the party
as strictly a tool of political elites to gain office. Rather, Eldersveld analyzed parties and
their structures from the elites to the masses. Eldersveld expanded the definition of party
elites, to include not just those seeking to hold office, but also those who worked for the
party. The importance of those he called the ‘party activists’, members of the party who
hold important positions, have roles of influence, and who exercise important functions in
the party. He purposely broadened the definition of party elites to underscore the
importance of these activists in the party. “The party activist cadre keep the party an
organizational reality and do thus contribute significantly both to party system survival
and to party system adaptation to new social forces” (Eldersveld 1989, 14). Eldersveld’s
broadening of the definition of party elites is important because it helped move away
from oversimplifying the purpose and characterization of party elites and signifying the
importance of party membership as a whole.
Eldersveld found that with an expanded definition of party elites, party structure
and purpose became clearer. In opposition to Michels’ Iron Law and the oligarchical
tendencies of party elites, Eldersveld found that three theoretical constructs emerged in
6

regards to parties. First, parties had to be understood to be permeable and adaptive,
always open for new membership, not only at the base level in regards to new party
activists to do party work, but also with non-activist supporters. Also, the party is open at
the elite level, if such a strategy will profit the parties aspirations. Second, because parties
are a structural system seeking to translate social and economic interests into political
power, it inevitably becomes a conflict system (Eldersveld 1968, 44-47). Finally,
Eldersveld found that party power and structure is not hierarchical. Rather it is defined by
what he called stratarchy. Stratarchy refers to the “proliferation of the ruling group and
diffusion of power prerogatives and exercise. Rather than a centralized ‘unit of
command’… ‘strata commas’ exist which operate with a varying, but considerable degree
of, independence” (Eldersveld 1968, 49). The idea of stratarchy is vital to understanding
Eldersveld’s definition of political parties, because unlike scholars that came before him,
he focused on party activists, or members, as a whole, and their functions within the
party.
Generally speaking, definitions of political parties include some mention of the
party as a ‘social’ group. The characterization of political parties as more than factions,
voting blocs, or interest groups, comes down to the fact that there is a large social
component to political parties. And this social component is important to understanding
how tradition, history, and socio-economic factors shape party interests, positions, and
conflict. The base membership of the party, what Eldersveld referred to as “the critical
action locus of the party”, drives parties as they enter into electoral conflict, and
personifies the social dimension of political parties (Eldersveld 1964, 9). From these
theoretical constructs, a clear and concise definition of political parties emerges.
7

The political party is a social group, a system of meaningful
and patterned activity within the larger society. It consists of a
set of individuals populating specific roles and behaving as
member-actors of a boundaried and identifiable social unit.
Goals are perceived by these actors, tasks are assigned for and
by them, and communication channels are maintained
(Eldersveld 1968, 42).

This definition is a vital guide to understanding the nature of political parties in Poland.
Poland’s Communist history still casts a long shadow on its political parties. Employing
Eldersveld’s definition of a political party, especially his emphasis on broadening the
sense of party elites, helps to understand how Poland’s political parties are organized,
gain support, and survive electoral competition.
The purpose of this study is to examine whether EU membership and integration
has become a realigning or political cleavage in regards to party politics. In Patterns of
Democracy, Arend Lijphart introduced seven issue dimensions of partisan conflict. These
seven issues areas were, (1) socio-economic, (2) religious, (3) cultural-ethnic, (4) urbanrural, (5) regime support, (6) foreign policy, and (7) post-materialist issues (Lijphart
1999, 79). The issues of EU membership and Europeanization would fall into the ‘foreign
policy’ dimension. Poland’s pre-communist history continues to shape political conflict
and party behavior to this day. To fully understand whether Polish political parties have
been undergoing a process of Europeanization or whether EU integration has been a
salient issue dimension for Poland’s political parties, the foundation and current state of
party politics must first be explored. The following section is a brief synopsis of the birth
and history of Poland’s political parties since 1989 and summarize Poland’s current
political party field. Poland’s political and party system is one of the most unique of the
8

post-communist democracies of Europe. Born out of compromise and molded by decades
of political fighting and fine-tuning, Poland’s party system is one of stability and
continuity, unlike many party systems in former communist states.
Poland’s Political and Party System
Poland’s path to democracy started with the conclusion of the 1989 Roundtable
Talks between the PZPR (the communist Polish United Worker’s Party) and
representatives of the Solidarity Movement. Political change and the transition to
democracy in Poland happened more swiftly than anyone could have anticipated. The
bargaining process of the Roundtable Talks were started with the support of the
leadership in Moscow. Throughout the 1980s, discontent with the communist party
reached a fever pitch. Mass strikes orchestrated by Solidarity movement, the imposition
of marshal law, and an economic downturn were all factors that led to the Roundtable
Talks. In 1986, after Mikhail Gorbachev announced his policies of glasnost (openness)
and perestroika (restructuring), the scene was set and the PZPR’s hand was forced to
enter in negotiations with Solidarity to avoid further domestic turmoil. (Kaminski 1999,
83-85).
Even with a green light from Moscow in support of liberalization, the leaders of
the PZPR entered the Roundtable Talks not expecting a transition to democracy. Rather,
the PZPR entered the negotiations expecting to give some concessions to its opposition,
while still maintaining its power. The PZPR believed that it could incorporate a carefully
crafted and well-organized political opposition into the government, while still
maintaining control. In doing so, the PZPR made two mistakes that led to the end of
communist rule in Poland. First, the PZPR had overestimated its support with the public.
9

Focusing on public opinion surveys conducted by the Center for Public Opinion (CBOS),
the PZPR felt that it enjoyed a great deal of support from the public. Its second mistake,
came during the actual talks, in which the PZPR agreed to a single-member district
majority runoff as electoral law.
Concluding the talks was the signing of the Roundtable Compact. The first semifree elections since before WWII were scheduled for June 1989, with thirty-five percent
of the lower house seats (Sejm) and one hundred percent of the higher house (Senate)
seats to be freely elected. A simple majority in the Sejm would select the Premier (Prime
Minister). In addition, a strong presidency would be created, with the candidate for
President elected with a simple majority by both houses (Kaminski 1999, 83, 88-89). The
political system created was a variation of what Maurice Duverger described as ‘semipresidential’, in which there is a president elected by universal suffrage, given
considerable powers, who coexists within a government that rests on the confidence
placed in a separately elected parliament (Duverger 1980, 165-167). This semipresidential system was created during the bargaining process as a compromise between
both sides. As Matthew Shugart and John M. Carey described this transition, “the
establishment of a presidency initially reserved for the outgoing dictator but subsequently
to be an elective position could be seen as an ingenious form of conflict resolution. The
Polish bargainers set aside a presidency to provide assurances to the defeated forces of
the old regime while leaving primary legislative responsibility to a more democratically
endowed parliament and a government responsible thereto” (Shugart and Carey 1992,
285).
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The June elections surprised both the PZPR and Solidarity. Solidarity won all of
the freely elected seats it was entitled to in the Sejm, and 99 out of the 100 seats in the
Senate, giving it blocking capacity. The PZPR won 37.6% of its allotted 65% of seats in
the Sejm, with the rest going to its puppet satellite parties and “catholic-Marxist” parties
under communist control. The PZPR’s underestimation of its popularity was a shock to
its members. This coupled with the weakness of the electoral law, through the majority
run off system, allowed Solidarity much greater power than the PZPR had anticipated
(Kaminski 1999, 89, 95-96). The PZPR did not want to give any leadership roles, the
presidency nor the premiership, to any member of the opposition. They believed that they
would be able to placate the opposition by giving Solidarity several cabinet posts under
the prime minister. On July 19th, General Wojciech Jaruzelski was elected President with
a majority of only one vote, and nominated General Czeslaw Kiszczak to the
premiership. However, Solidarity leaders were able to convince the PZPR’s communist
allies, the United Peasant Party (ZSL) and the Democratic Party (SD), to turn on the
PZPR and form a new coalition. The PZPR became the minority party, and the new
coalition government selected opposition activist Tadeusz Mazowiecki as the new
premier (Wrobel 2010, 273-275). The path to democracy was set. In December of 1989,
the Sejm approved government and economic reforms, as well as changes to the
constitution that would lead Poland to democracy. In January of 1990, the PZPR
dissolved itself ending over forty years of Communist rule in Poland. The first free and
open elections for the Presidency took place in 1990, with parliamentary elections taking
place a year later (Castle and Taras 2002, 95-96).
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The bargaining process of the Roundtable Talks was a back and forth game
between the PZPR and Solidarity. What was created is a system that still endures to this
day, although with some changes. Since the Roundtable Talks, the Constitution of the
People’s Republic of Poland was amended several times to be more democratic and
politically and economically liberal. The current Constitution of Poland was adopted in
April of 1997. The new constitution cut down on the power of the presidency. The
president is elected by popular vote to a five-year term and is the head of state. The only
legislative power the president has is the right to veto legislative. However a simple
majority in the Sejm can override the veto. The prime minster is chosen by the president,
and is usually the leader of the party that obtained the most seats in the Sejm. The prime
minister and his chosen cabinet are then appointed through a vote of confidence in the
Sejm. Members of the Sejm are elected to four-year terms by proportional representation
using the d’Hondt method, while the Senate is elected by a single member, first past the
post voting method (Nikolenyi 2014, Sydorchuk 2014). Elections to the EU Parliament
are conducted by elections in Poland’s thirteen constituencies, with seats allocated by the
d’Hondt method (European Parliament 2014a).
Poland can still be considered a consolidating democracy, still facing many
challenges as it transforms into a mature democracy (Kunovich 2013, 65). This fact is
highlighted by the state of political parties in Poland and the way party competition since
1989 has evolved. The Polish public is highly cynical of political parties and support for
individual parties is low. Recent public opinion polling shows that only 25% of Poles
consider any one party to be close to their views, while a majority, 56%, say that no party
aligns with their views (CBOS 2013a). Turnout for elections are low, especially for
12

legislative and EU Parliamentary election, while presidential elections, where the focus is
on the individuals running, is somewhat higher. Even with low levels of support, parties
have thrived and become the de facto mean of interest articulation and aggregation in the
Polish political system. Though Polish parties have thus far failed to cultivate their
electorates, because of Polish voters exhibiting low levels of party identification and high
levels of electoral volatility, Polish parties maintain an effective monopoly on forming
and shaping political discourse (Jasiewicz 2007, 96-101).
In regards to examining the effect that further EU integration has had on
Polish political parties, the political-social cleavages and issue dimensions that shape
party behavior have to be explained. The last section of this chapter will highlight how
parties born in a post-communist state behave and how this past affects the political
system. In addition to the expected left-right dimensions of party classification, tradition,
history, and culture are all important factors that shape party behavior in Poland. In order
to show that EU membership has had any effect on the political parties of Poland, a link
must be made between EU membership and a change in party behavior.
Polish Parties and Issue Dimensions
Several different variables can be linked to the stability of party systems in new
democracies, such as the permissiveness of electoral institutions, the emergence and
strength of certain social cleavages, history of the previous regime, and economic
conditions. However, one area of research into party systems of post-communist states
that also can be an important variable of stability is that of party organization. Margit
Tavits found that in post-communist states in Central and Eastern Europe, party
organizational strength was an important variable in determining electoral success. She
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found that strong party organization, regardless of party wealth, resources, or popularity
of party leaders, was an important factor in continued electoral success (Tavits 2013, 67).
Party organization is an important indicator in examining Polish political parties.
In new democracies, especially those in post-communist states, Tavits found that party
competition and party systems were not structured in the same way that they are in more
advanced democracies. In new democracies, voters lack experience with the functions of
a democratic electoral system, are less likely to identify with a certain political party, are
more likely to be confused about the ideological difference between parties, and may
even be hostile to parties. In addition to these factors, in post-communist democracies,
the social cleavages arising in the new democracy were not as pronounced or even
existed under the previous regime. Communist societies were leveled in terms of social
class, urban-rural differences eliminated, the role of religion largely diminished, and
ethnic difference suppressed (Tavits 2013, 5-8). Finally, Tavits argued that organizational
strength was important because it influenced party unity. The stronger the party
organization, the more valuable party identification becomes in terms of electoral success
(ibid, 9).
These findings are important to understanding the Polish party system. In 1991,
after the first fully free legislative elections, 29 parties were awarded seats in the Sejm.
By the next election, only five of those parties had survived to win elections. By the end
of the most recent elections in 2011, only two of those parties still had seats in the Sejm.
This volatility in the electoral success of parties underscores the dynamic nature of party
competition in Poland. However, there are certain elements of the party system that show
stability and continuity. Regardless of the party composition, all governments since 1989
14

have conducted largely similar domestic and foreign policies. They have developed a
market economy and pursued the integration of Poland into European and Atlantic
structures. Secondly, voters seem to be less confused ideologically than party elites, and
tend to support political parties that are aligned with their political ideologies. Ideologies
in Poland can be separated into four distinct political fields. The first encompasses voters
that strongly support secularism and a free market enterprise system, which can be
described as a liberal democratic field. A combination of pro market reforms and high
religiosity brings about a Christian Democratic field. Thirdly, support for state
interventionism and religiosity creates a populist field. Finally, support for state
intervention and secularism identified as a socialist field. With these four political fields,
describing Polish party politics through the traditional left-right political dimensions
obscures party positions in the political field (Jasiewicz 2007, 86-89).
Voters preferences and party activity within these four fields, lead to the
polarization and fragmentation of parties in Poland. Political party positions in these four
fields are more strongly related to one of these cleavages, and are more ambiguous in
relation to others. Within this, two major cleavages are salient to the study of party
politics in Poland. The first is the socio-economic cleavage, and the divide between
support for neoliberal free market enterprise and the support for state intervention in
economic matters and welfare-state type social policies. The second is an ideological
cleavage that can be understood as a choice between different visions of social and
political order. Included within this cleavage are the issues dividing citizens between
Poland’s strong Catholic traditionalism, with a strong anti-communist component, and
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cosmopolitan secularism, with an indifference to Poland’s Communist past (Jasiewicz
2007, 88, 111-112).
These cleavages are most apparent at the party elite level. Every government
since 1991 can either be described as post-communist or post-opposition, meaning that
either members or supporters of the communist regime, or those that were members of
the Solidarity movement formed the majority coalition. This cleavage characterizes the
left-right dimensions of party politics in Poland, with leftist parties viewed as the
successors of the communist party and the right wing seen as the successors of the
Solidarity movement. This divide extends to the public. Even those who were born after
the fall of communism or took no part in the communist regime are divided based on
their feelings of Poland’s communist past, and can be placed on the left-right political
spectrum based on their attitudes (Castle and Taras 2002, 108-113, 161-162). This
cleavage is also tied to the role of the Catholic Church and religiosity in Poland. Though
96% of Poles identify as Catholic, the religious cleavage is based on the divide between
devout Catholics and those in whose lives the church does not play a vital role (Castle
and Taras 2002, 158).
Unlike the political cleavage that results from Poland’s communist past and
religiosity, economic factors have not been as salient of a cleavage in Polish party
politics, on either the elite or public level. There has been a lot of continuity in the
economic policies of every government, regardless of party affiliation. There are
differences between the left and right parties based within the free-market/welfare state
dimensions, but they have largely been unchanged by either side. Poles do differ from
one another in terms of class and occupational differences. The end of communism’s
16

most profound effects were on the working middle class, with the shrinking of the
manufacturing and industrial sector. Agricultural workers, which constitute one in four
Poles, have remained largely unchanged since the fall of communism. However, the
service industry and opportunities for white-collar employment have increased since the
end of communism. In terms of the political system, factors such as unemployment are
most critical during elections, while the divide between free market enterprise and social
policies are not as pronounced (Castle and Taras 2007, 153-155; Jackson et al 2010).
Membership in the EU encompasses a wide field of political and economic issues.
The division of Poland’s political system based on its communist past and religious
context shapes party behavior and dictates electoral success. The purpose of this study is
to analyze if, and how, the added dimension of EU membership ads to shaping party
politics. Chapter two will deal with the issues of European integration and
Europeanization. It will analyze the theoretical background of what European integration
and Europeanization is, provide a review of literature on the Europeanization of political
parties in Europe, and finally summarize the findings of previous scholarly work on the
Europeanization of political parties in Poland in the first five years of membership.
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Chapter 2- European Integration and Europeanization
European Integration
European integration refers to the process of economic, political, monetary, and
social integration of the states of the EU. European integration is a process that has been
evolving since the end of WW II. The aftermath of WWII created staggering economic
and reconstruction problems. Europe needed help to rebuild itself and a need for stability
and peace created the conditions for what would become the EU. Through the funds
provided by the European Recovery Program (ERP), more commonly known as the
Marshall Plan, the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), later
renamed the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), provided
a framework for European states to cooperate and integrate across national borders.
Shortly after the founding of the OEEC, the Council of Europe was created, which would
lead to the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the precursor to
the eventual creation of the EU. The ECSC was the brainchild of Jean Monnet, a French
civil servant, who believed that economic integration in the coal and steel industrial
sectors of Europe would to a supranationally regulated market that would encourage
peace and stability. Monnet presented his vision to French foreign minister Robert
Schuman, who fought for the creation of the ECSC. In 1951, after the signing of the
Treaty of Paris, the ECSC was established, setting up an organizational blueprint for the
future of Europe (Staab 2011, 5-8).
European integration would be furthered through the signing of EU Treaties.
Table 1 shows a summary of EU Treaties, from the establishment of the ESCS in 1951, to
the signing of the latest EU treaty, the Lisbon Treaty in 2007. The two forces of
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intergovernmentalism and supranationalism have defined European integration since
WWII. Supranationalism refers to the creation of institutions and policies that would
supersede the power of their national counterparts. Intergovernmentalism envisions
European integration as a process that minimizes the creation of new institutions and
policies in favor of conducting integration through a process between national
governments (Staab 2011, 5-6). This intergovernmental-supranational divide has
characterized efforts of EU integration since the signing of the Treaty of Paris.
Inherently, European integration involves national governments voluntarily entering into
agreements that can put constraints on national sovereignty and the autonomy of national
governments in favor of joint decision-making and pooled sovereignty between the
members of the EU (Bache et al 2011, 3,17).

Table 1- Timeline of EU Treaties
Signed
Entered into Force
Treaty
European Coal and Steel Community
1951
1952
(ECSC)
European Economic Community (EEC)
European Atomic Energy Community
(EURATOM)
Single European Act (SEA)
Treaty on the European UnionMaastricht Treaty (TEU)
Treaty of Amsterdam
Treaty of Nice
Lisbon Treaty

1957
1957

1958
1958

1986
1992

1987
1993

1997
2001
2007

1999
2003
2009

(Staab 2011, 9)

The struggle of whether the European project would result in a supranational
structure or simply be an intergovernmental project has been a back and forth game
primarily between elites. Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman envisioned a European
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community that would be integrated not only economically, but also politically. The
signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957, established the European Economic Community
(EEC) , which sought further economic integration and set an ambitious framework for
future political integration. However, throughout the 1950s and 60s, efforts for a united
European Political Community failed. The first blow to this political unification was the
failure of the French parliament to ratify the proposals of a European Defense
Community (EDC) in 1952. The incorporation of Western European nations into the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), particularly the addition of West Germany
in 1955, the idea of the EDC evaporated. In the 1960s, the sovereignty of national
governments and the will of government leaders further eliminated hopes of political
integration. Most notably was the so-called “empty chair crisis” in which French
President Charles de Gaulle, recalled all French Ministers from Brussels. The actions of
de Gaulle were in response to Walter Hallstein, the president of the European
Commission, and his plan to introduce majority voting into the EEC (Staab 2011, 9-12).
The intergovernmental state of mind in Europe persisted with little variation until
the 1980s. A significant change occurred in 1979, when Members of the European
Parliament (MEPs) were directly elected by the citizens of European Community (EC)
members. Although the European Parliament (EP) had only an advisory role, it did give a
much needed degree of legitimacy to the EC. The EC project, and European integration,
was largely seen by the public as an elite-driven process. The election of MEPs by
citizens finally gave the citizens of the EC a voice and was the start to the elimination of
a much-perceived democratic deficit in the EC (Staab 2011, 16; Finke 2010, 6-7).
Supranationalism began to dominate European integration in the 1980s, with the signing
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of the Single European Act (SEA). The SEA introduced majority voting, eliminating the
veto power of member states, gave more power to the EP by giving it a voice in
amending legislation, and also set a deadline for the Single European Market (SEM) to be
implemented by 1992 (Staab 2011, 18-19).
The 1990s and the new millennium saw the implementation of four new treaties
that further integrated Europe, that would see further supranational European integration.
The fall of the Soviet Union, and the seeking of greater cooperation of the former
communist satellite states with Western Europe signaled more changes to the structure of
the EC. The result was the Treaty on the European Union (TEU), also called the
Maastricht Treaty, signed in 1992. The EC was renamed the European Union (EU), gave
citizens of the EU member states uniform rights, gave even more power to the EP with
the power to draft legislation, and elevating new policy fields away from national
governments and to the EU. The Maastricht Treaty created three pillars, the Economic
Community, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and the Justice and Home
Affairs (JHA) pillars. The Economic Community was the greatest achievement in terms
of supranational governments. It created the single currency, Euro, and the Economic
Monetary Union (EMU), which created a single monetary policy for all EU members.
After serious setbacks in ratification of the TEU in Denmark, France, and the UK, the
second and third pillars of the EU took a more intergovernmental character, as decisions
regarding the CFSP and JHA had to be undertaken through unanimous decision of
member states (Staab 2011, 19-23).
The Treaty of Amsterdam, signed in 1997, and the Treaty of Nice of 2001, further
tried to increase the supranational powers of the EU. The Treaty of Amsterdam’s most
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important features were the creation of the Schengen Agreement, which allowed for the
free movement of people, goods, and services across national borders, created the
position of the High Representative for the CFSP, and clarified the concept of European
citizenship. However, the UK, Ireland, and Denmark all received opt-out clauses for the
Schengen Agreement, cutting down on the power of the treaty. The Treaty of Nice was a
response to institutional and enlargement challenges facing the EU. The size of the EP
was capped at 732 MEPs and a new voting formula was introduced in the Council of
Ministers (the intergovernmental forum for legislative approval). A fundamental rights
charter however failed to be included as part of the Treaty after UK Prime Minister Tony
Blair refused to allow the charter to be enforceable in the UK. The Treaty of Nice
attempted to address some of the undemocratic practices of the EU and eliminate the
democratic deficit. However, unanimous voting was still a part of many policy areas,
such as taxes, the CFSP, and JHA (Staab 2011, 23-27).
The most recent EU treaty was the Lisbon Treaty, ratified in 2009. The Lisbon
Treaty came as a result of the failure to ratify a Constitution of Europe. Spain and Poland
refused to ratify the Constitution, on the grounds that it would give them a smaller voice
in terms of voting rights. The Lisbon Treaty was a water-downed form of the
Constitution. New institutional mechanism, such as an increase in MEPs to 750 and the
extension of an equal partnership between the EP and Council of Ministers on approving
legislation were ratified with the treaty. The Three Pillars of the Maastricht Treaty were
eliminated, and the European integration project was put under the umbrella of the EU.
Power of review of EU legislation was also given to national assemblies, which could
send legislative back to the Commission if one third of assemblies voiced concerns. The
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EU’s powers also grew greater in terms of its role as a supranational institution. The
European Court of Justice was given authority to rule over JHA issues and allowed to
overrule national courts within this domain. The Treaty of Lisbon also created new
offices, the President of the European Council and the High Representative for Common
and Security Policy. Although some member states, such as the UK and Ireland were able
to negotiate opt-out clauses to certain features of the treaty, the Treaty of Lisbon
strengthened the EU as a supranational organization. Unanimous approval was eliminated
on most all policy areas, except for defense and taxation (Staab 2011, 27-30).
Since 1986, the treaties of integration have propelled the EU into a strong
supranational institution. Although there have been setbacks in terms of government optouts for certain EU measures, the treaties have overall strengthened the EU as a united
entity in the global world. A further development of the treaties has been a greater voice
for the citizens of the EU. Once considered an elite project, European integration has
been largely impacted by the citizens of the EU. In addition to the direct election of
MEPs, the use of national referendums has been an area that has effected integration and
changed its scope. Since 1972, there have been over forty referendums held on various
aspects of European integration, with the majority of referendums held on the issues of
EU membership and candidacy (Hobolt 2009, 7-11; European Election Database).
The prevalence of referendums on European integration has opened up research
opportunities attempting to explain how citizens of the EU vote in these referendums.
Sara Binzer Hobolt studied the voting behaviors and patterns of EU citizens during
referendums on European integration. She found that voters take into consideration a
broad spectrum of issues related to European integration. They often make choices
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between their perceived benefits and costs of accepting proposals that may take powers
from the nation state, and weighing them against the dangers of rejecting a proposal that
could leave their country on the sideline of the EU. Furthermore, she found that voters in
many cases to look to parties in deciding how they will vote. The information given to
voters by parties can shape the outcome of a vote. Voters also look at cues given to them
by parties in deciding whether to vote yes or no on a referendum (Hobolt 2009. 233-249).
Public opinion and the preference of voters also have an effect on parties and
their positions on European integration. As European integration has evolved through the
various treaties, the way party elites and government leaders frame their positions on
European integration has also changed. Prior to the Maastricht treaty, the interests of the
most powerful domestic producers were identified as the most relevant to understanding
the origins of governmental positions on integration. In particular, the divide between the
powerful industrial sectors of the north and powerful agricultural sectors of the south
framed positions on integration. As the agenda of EU treaties shifted from economic to
political integration and institutional reforms, governmental positions on integration
shifted as well. Post Maastricht, positions on integration became more heavily contested
at the domestic level, as voters’ participation and interest in EU politics has been steadily
increasing. Conventional wisdom used to dictate that member states that received the
greatest benefits from EU membership, either through the common market or as
beneficiaries of EU funds, were the greatest supporters of further integration. However,
studies have shown that this is not the case. Rather, governments have increasingly
looked at public opinion and support of integration of its citizens to craft their positions
(Finke 2010, 134-145).
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Increased importance of EU politics as the domestic levels, as well as the greater
incorporation of the citizenry of the EU into the mechanism of integration has shaped the
integration process. One of the chief issues that have arisen with further European
integration has been that of Europeanization. Europeanization, sometimes referred to as
Europeanism, is the result of European integration. With increased integration, questions
of Europeaness and notions of a European identity arise. This issue is a polarizing divide
in the politics of the EU. The following section will define Europeanization and its
importance in terms of European integration and its effects on the political and party
systems of member states.
Europeanization Defined
Defining and conceptualizing Europeanization is a monumental task. The term
has been used in scholarly work since at least the 1990s. However, the term
Europeanization has fallen victim to either being under-theorized or conceptually
confused. In order to fully grasp the meaning of Europeanization and understand its
effects on political parties, the concept has to be defined for the purpose of this study.
John Gerring identified a criterial framework for understanding how to form a
new concept. He argued that for a concept to be sound, it has to have three elements. The
first is extension, or the events or phenomena to be defined. The second, intension, refers
to the properties that distinguish one concept from another. Thirdly, the term, or the label
that covers the first two elements (Gerring 1999, 357-358). In addition to these three
elements, Gerring also offered an eight-part ‘criteria of conceptual goodness’. This
criteria included; familiarity, resonance, parsimony, coherence, differentiation, depth,
theoretical utility and field utility (Table 2 explains each of the criteria) (ibid, 367-368).
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Following Gerring’s framework, a definition of Europeanization can be constructed, that
is not under-defined or conceptually stretched. This eight-part framework provides a
readily available schema from which someone is able to easily judge the relative
strengths and weaknesses of a concept. Familiarity, the degree to which a new definition
makes sense or is clear, so that it can be fully understood. Resonance, or what Gerring
referred to as the ‘cognitive click’, gives the new concept power. Parsimony is the sign of
a good concept, in that its definition is not endless, and that the concept should be able to
be described with only a few attributes. Coherence is the sense in which the attributes and
the definition of the concept belong to one another. Differentiation is important to a good
concept because it gives clarity to the concept apart from already existing concepts.
Depth of concept is vital to understand the instances/characteristics that bundle under the
umbrella of the concept. Finally, theoretical utility refers to the concept’s ability to help
in the development and formation of theses, while field utility ensures that the concept
causes the least amount of disruption in the ‘semantic field’ (Gerring 1999, 368-384).

Table 2- Gerring’s Criteria of Conceptual Goodness
How familiar is the concept?
1. Familiarity
2. Resonance
Does the chosen term ring (resonate)?
3. Parsimony
How short is a) the term and b) its list of defining attributes (the
intension)?
4. Coherence
How internally consistent (logically related) are the instances
and attributes?
5. Differentiation
How differentiated are the instances and the attributes (from
other most-similar concepts)? How bounded, how
operationizable, is the concept?
6. Depth
How many accompanying properties are shared by instances
under definition?
7. Theoretical Utility How useful is the concept within a wider field of interest?
8. Field Utility
How useful is the concept within a field of related instances and
attributes?
(Gerring 1999, 367).
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Using these criteria of conceptual goodness, many present ideas and definitions of
Europeanization can be dismissed. Some definitions of Europeanization have referred to
it as the development of institutions of governance at the European level (Cowles et al,
2001, 3), others have defined is as the distinct forms of governance that have been
exported outside of Europe’s boundaries (Cole and Drake 2000, 27), or that the concept
refers to an idea of identity and post-modern values that are unique to Europe
(McCormick 2007, 166). However the problems with these definitions is that they do not
adequately describe Europeanization. The first definition refers to the process of
European integration, the second explains the process of ‘policy transfer’, while the third
definition explains one side of post-modern values, that could be extended easily outside
of Europe. Europeanization is more concrete than a set of values, more intensive than the
export of policies, and goes beyond simple matters of integration. Europeanization has to
be thought of as a stand-alone process as a result of European integration, in which EU
governance and institutions have transformed the domestic policies of member states.
Claudio Radaelli presents one of the most commonly cited definitions of
Europeanization, which also fulfills Gerring’s criteria of a good concept. He defines
Europeanization as “processes of (a) construction, (b) diffusion, and (c)
institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles,
and ‘ways of doing things’ and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and
consolidated in the EU policy process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic
(national) discourse, political structures, and public policies” (Radaelli 2000, 4). Radaelli
also further states what Europeanization is not. Europeanization is not a convergence, of
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policy or otherwise, between the bodies of EU governance and domestic governing
bodies. Although convergence is possible, Europeanization can produce divergence.
Radaelli also makes a clear distinction between European integration and
Europeanization. Europeanization is not political integration, but rather Europeanization
is a consequence of integration (ibid). This definition is especially important for the
course of this study, as it focuses on how the process of Europeanization is incorporated
into the domestic politics of member states.
With a working definition of Europeanization at hand, how can scholars be sure
that Europeanization does affect domestic politics, or party politics? Robert Ladrech
introduced an analytical framework that has been employed by numerous scholars to
investigate whether there is a Europeanization effect on member states’ political parties.
Ladrech stated that the primary task for the analyst is to “…trace changes back to an EU
source, or else to recognize an intended use of the EU as a possible aid in the resolution
of an issue, or to evaluate the problems that the presence of the EU issue presents for
parties” (Ladrech 2002, 396). Ladrech identified five areas of investigating the effect of
Europeanization on political parties.
The first was Programmatic change, citing that the most explicit type of evidence
of Europeanization will lie in the modifications of political party programs. This can be
measured quantitatively by the increased mention of the EU in electoral programs and
references tying the EU to policy areas normally considered to be of a domestic arena,
such as unemployment. Qualitatively, references to the EU as a factor in pursuing
national policies, references to transnational organizations and EP party federations, as
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well as mention of EU institutions, can all signal a Europeanization effect on parties
(Ladrech 2002, 396-397).
Secondly, organizational change, through the affiliation of parties with European
level institutions and organizational links with actors outside of the domestic arena, can
signal the Europeanization of political parties. This can include the incorporation of
references to a party’s respective transnational party federation, or domestic party leaders
entering EU institutions (Ladrech 2002, 397). Third, patterns of party competition can
also be investigation for possible Europeanization. This refers to the extent that the EU
itself becomes politicized in national elections and politics, and the way in which parties
seek new voters by using an either anti- or pro-EU position (ibid). The fourth part of the
framework, party-government relations, refers to the party-government relations on EU
matters. Parties may either be pushed or pulled by EU issues. A government can be
pushed by a party to maximize positions close to the party program, or pulled by parties
to distance themselves from positions of institutional change, if national sovereignty
could be undermined (ibid, 398). Finally, the fifth part of the framework refers to the
relations beyond the national party system. Europeanization could have an effect on the
transnational cooperation of parties from different EU member states to the extent that
new organizational and programmatic activities are promoted (ibid, 399). An example of
this would be two Christian Democratic Parties having regular meetings on EU policies.
With this five-point framework in mind, party systems of EU member states can be
analyzed and a Europeanization effect found. Ladrech’s framework is one that has been
employed by several scholars and will also be employed as part of this study.
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Having a working definition of Europeanization and a working analytical
framework to study political parties, the final sections of this chapter will examine
evidence of the Europeanization of political parties. The next section will explore
previous scholarly work on the Europeanization of political parties in EU member states,
and will look specifically at the evidence of Europeanization of Polish political parties
between the years 2004-2009.
Europeanization of Political Parties; Poland 2004-2009
The effect of European integration on the Europeanization of political parties can
be understood through two related dimensions. On one hand, Europeanization can be
viewed as having a shaping effect on parties. As Europe becomes a more important issue
in domestic politics, parties are forced to take positions on European issues, policies, and
developments. On the other hand, Europeanization has a strategic dimension, in that
parties may seek to use Europeanization as a political strategy (Hepburn 2010, 12). Eve
Hepburn’s research on the Europeanization of political parties focused on how regional
parties in Sardinia, Bavaria, and Scotland responded to European integration. She found
evidence that demonstrated regional parties had undergone a Europeanization effect. The
formulation of positions on EU policy, participating in European-wide networks and
organizations, and overall increased engagement in European activities all demonstrated
a Europeanization effect on these regional parties. Furthermore, she found that EU and
European issues were not affiliated with a particular ideology, and that these issues cut
through the traditional left-right political dimensions of party competition. This allowed
parties to advance their own interpretation of European policies and integration, aligning
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their views of European issues with their party’s policy demands (Hepburn 2010, 20,
195).
The accession of Poland into the EU on May 1st, 2004 was the most important
event in Poland’s political history since the collapse of the Soviet Union. European
integration in Poland has been described as a “return to Europe”, and the accession of
Poland into the EU can be linked to the broader process of political transformation postcommunism in Poland (Klatt 2012, 14; Szczerbiak 2012, 9). Figure 1 presents the
timeline of Poland’s ‘return to Europe’. EU membership was the realization of Poland’s
return to Europe and reaffirmed its legitimate place in European politics. In Poland, the
prospect of EU membership and was a reintegration into the West, giving Poland access
to Western markets, investments, and financial services, and was viewed as a catalyst for
greater standards of living. Unlike other countries, Poland initially did not view EU
membership as a constraint on national sovereignty or independence.
Accession negotiations and the first years of EU membership were marked by
problems, mostly based in the political competition of the ruling parties of the Polish
government. The governments following the 1991 and 1993 general elections crafted
Poland’s pro-Western and pro-European foreign policies, and subsequent governments
continued these policies. The result of the 1997 elections saw the right wing Solidarity
Electoral Action (AWS) grouping take control of the government from the postcommunist left Democratic Left Alliance (SLD).
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Year
1989
1990
1990
1991
1994
1997
1998
1999
2002
2003
2004
2009
2011
2014

Figure 1- Timeline of Poland and the Return to Europe
Event
Roundtable Talks
First Semi-Free Elections
PZPR dissolves after final congress
First free and open Presidential Elections
First free and open Parliamentary Elections
Poland’s application for EU membership submitted
EU Summit in Luxembourg- invitation to open accession negotiations
extended to Poland, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, and Slovenia
Formal negotiations with ‘Luxembourg Group’ begin
Poland joins NATO
Negotiations between Poland and the EU finalized
Treaty for Accession signed
National Referendum in Poland passes with 77% approval for membership
Poland becomes Member of the EU
Eastern Partnership (EaP) finalized
Poland holds the Presidency of the Council of Europe
Former PM Donald Tusk becomes President of the European Council

The SLD government, in coalition with the Polish Peasant Party (PSL), had submitted the
formal application for EU membership in 1994. Over the next several years, the member
states of the EU began planning on how to accommodate an Eastern enlargement. Poland
was a particularly challenging hurdle, as it was the largest country seeking accession,
both in size and population. These difficulties were also exacerbated by Poland’s
backward agricultural sector, the structure of its economy, and disparity with EU norms
(Szczerbiak 2012, 10-11). The AWS was not a formal political party, rather a fragmented
and fractionalized grouping encompassing similar ideologies. The AWS also was in a
coalition with the Freedom Union (UW) and the far right clerical-nationalist Christian
National Union (ZChN) party, all led by Prime Minister Jerzy Buzek. Because of the
anti-EU stances of the UW and ZChN, and a large Eurosceptic support base of the AWS,
Buzek took a hardline approach and uncompromising stance to negotiations with the EU.
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The result of this approach was a stalemate in EU accession negotiations, as Buzek tried
to win over his coalitions base of support.
In the 2001 Elections, the AWS was defeated and the SLD returned to power.
The SLD government, under PM Leszek Miller fulfilled its promise to speed up
accession negotiations, granting major concessions to the EU on completing various
chapters of the Copenhagen Criteria1. However, the 2001 Elections did give a rise to antiEU parties. Namely, Self Defense (SO) and the League of Polish Families (LPR), both
won seats. These two parties would later spearhead the anti-membership campaign in the
run up to the 2003 membership referendum. The SLD once again entered into a coalition
government with the PSL. Before membership in the EU was finalized, two small hurdles
in negotiations between Poland and the EU were worked out. Following an EU Summit
in Copenhagen in 2002, news emerged that Poland would become a net contributor to the
EU budget, because its accession would provoke a budget crisis in the EU. As a result,
the Miller government took a tougher stance in the final phases of negotiations to ensure
this was not the case. Secondly, a proposal from the EU Commission stating that postcommunist states would not receive full agricultural subsidies for the first nine years of
membership created problems in Poland. Again the government had to take a hard line in
negotiations over this proposal, because of Poland’s reliance on its agricultural sector.
The base of the PSL’s support were Polish farmers, and as coalition partners with the
SLD, were able to spur PM Miller into a tough stance. In the end, last minute agreements
on the EU budget and support for agricultural subsidies allowed for accession
negotiations to continue. Poland finished accession negotiations in 2002 and after the
1

The Copenhagen Criteria are the various chapters of the EU’s rules for accession.
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sighing of the Treaty of Accession in 2003, the referendum on Polish membership passed
with a margin of 77.54% to 22.55% (Szczerbiak 2012, 12-15).
The accession negotiations and resulting referendum showed that Poland was a
willing new member of the EU. With the support of its elites, as well as the public,
Poland, (along with Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania,
Malta, Slovakia, and Slovenia) became the newest member of the EU in 2004. The
accession process showed that there was a considerably large segment of the population
that was against membership in the EU and European integration, and this voice was
represented in the government.
Aleks Szczerbiak, author of Poland within the European Union, wrote the most
comprehensive account of the effect of Europeanization on the political parties of Poland.
His study examined the effect European integration had on Poland’s parties during the
first five years of membership. Using the framework developed by Robert Ladrech,
Szczerbiak examined the six parties and political groupings that won the most seats in the
parliamentary elections between 2001 and 2009. (Appendix A provides a table of Polish
Parliamentary election results from 2001-2011). The six parties in his study were the
Civic Platform (PO), Democratic Left Alliance (SLD), Law and Justice Party (PiS), the
Polish Peasant Party (PSL), Self Defense (SO), and League of Polish Families (LPR).
The first part of Ladrech’s framework of Europeanization was to examine how
European issues or developments emerged as issues of contestation in inter-party
competition. Szczerbiak found that in the elections of 2005 and 2007, the role of the EU
was largely diminished and was not a salient issue in terms of party competition. The one
exception to this was the issue of the ratification of the European Constitution before the
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2005 elections. However, after the Constitutional Treaty faced no votes in France and
Spain, plans for a referendum in Poland were scrapped and EU issues took a back seat
during the campaign. During the 2007 election, the EU issue again seemed to gain
importance with infighting between the PO and PiS. However, it was not the issue of
European integration that took center stage during the campaign. Rather, it was the issue
of the government’s conduct of European policy, as the issues of Europe become
assimilated in more general domestic debates (Szczerbiak 2012, 164-168).
The prominence of European issues in party programs, the second tenant of
Ladrech’s framework, can be measured by examining the amount of space specifically
devoted to European policy and the number of mentions of the EU in other sections of the
party program that would previously have been considered the domain of domestic
policies. Party programs in Poland fall into a political grey area. Party programs are
“rarely reported in the media. They are almost never discussed by a political party’s rank
and file, nor do party political activists contribute to their contents. They are also largely
ignored by the party’s opponents… they are useful though…as they provide a snapshot of
the state of mind of a party’s political leadership as it faces the votes” (Bobinski 2007, 4).
Szczerbiak found that for the 2001, 2005, and 2007 elections, programs varied in length,
and some parties did not produce or update their programs for successive elections. He
found no link between the support or opposition to EU integration and the amount of
space devoted to European policy in party programs. However, there was a trend across
all party programs, to include more mentions of the EU and Europe in sections of the
party programs that would have been considered in the domestic policies domain,
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showing slight support for the Europeanization of parties in Poland in this realm
(Szczerbiak 2012, 168-173).
The increased role of European integration on party organization was also
minimal. Only two parties, the PO and SLD changed their party structures in response to
EU membership. Both parties allowed their MEPs to participate in their party’s
parliamentary caucus. The smallest impact of the EU on party organization was evident
in the examples of PiS, the PSL, LPR, and SO. In these parties there was virtually no
impact on the organization of the party after accession to the EU. Prior to accession, the
PSL had a commission on international affairs and European integration, which ceased to
exist once Poland became a member of the EU, and the forum for European integration
was discontinued shortly after membership due to lack of interest (Szczerbiak 2012, 174176).
Finally, the impact of European transnational party influences was also not
significant. The exceptions were the PO and the SLD, whose MEPs were part of large EP
groupings. These parties also created links to domestic parties in other EU member states
and transnational political groupings. The impact of European transnational influences
was the smallest in relation to the PSL, SO, and LPR. During the time period of
Szczerbiak’s study these parties had the smallest number of MEPs. Therefore, they did
not create any significant transnational links. SO only had one MEP and he was not
invited to join any EP party grouping. The PSL only had five MEPS, and their impact on
creating transnational links did not go beyond joining an EP party group. The LPR, which
did have ten representative in the EP, failed to make any meaningful transnational links.
Due to political fighting within the LPR, the party split and with its MEPs. Some chose to
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be non-aligned, and others joined more Euro-skeptic parties in the EP (Szczerbiak 2012,
177-180).
The first five years of EU membership showed there was not a significant
Europeanization effect on the political parties in Poland. The most prominent examples
of Europeanization were in the PO and SLD, who were part of large EP groupings and
sought to create transnational links with other parties in Europe. However, even with this
in mind, the measurable impact of the EU on Polish parties was overall small. Party
organizations remained largely unchanged and party programs did not cast European
issues into a realm of great importance. Instead of being a realignment issue, membership
in the EU was simply absorbed and assimilated into domestic policies. Instead of having
a direct impact on the political parties, European integration and EU membership was
subtle. Although the issue of the Constitutional Treaty was a significant source of
political fighting between parties during the 2005 election, the failure of its ratification in
Spain and France and dissolved the salience of the issue. Party patterns of activity and
competition during the 2005 and 2007 elections remained largely unchanged in terms of
EU membership.
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Chapter 3 The Europeanization of Polish Political Parties 2009-2014
This chapter will examine the Europeanization of Polish political parties in the
latter half of the first decade of Poland’s membership in the EU. Between 2009 and 2014,
Poland held four elections, one for the presidency in 2010, legislative elections in 2011,
and two EP Elections, in 2009 and 2014. (Tables 3, 4, 5, and 6 show the results of these
elections). This study will be similar to the one undertaken by Aleks Szczerbiak, although
with some changes, most notably with the parties studied. PO, PiS, SLD, and PSL, which
were profiled in Szczerbiak’s study, will again be examined. However, LPR and SO will
not, as these parties are no longer represented in the legislature. Adding to the four parties
mentioned above, Palikot’s Movement (RP), now called Your Movement (TR), will be
examined, as well as the Congress of the New Right (KNP) and its successor parties, the
Freedom and Justice Party (WiP), and the Coalition for the Renewal of the RepublicFreedom and Hope (KORWiN). Although the KNP is not represented in the Sejm, during
the 2014 EU Parliamentary Election, it succeeded in sending four of its members to the
EP. This chapter will examine some of the significant developments in the relationship
between Poland and the EU from 2009 to 2014, then continue with an analysis using
Robert Ladrech’s framework of Europeanization on the six above mentioned parties.

Developments since 2009
The first decade of EU membership has been a successful one for Poland in
economic terms. In the first ten years of membership, Poland was the largest single
beneficiary of EU budget funds, receiving over EUR 61.4 Billion. This will remain
unchanged for the EU budget period of 2014-2020. Despite mass cuts to the EU budget,
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Poland has been earmarked over EUR 108 Billion, which will again make it the largest
net beneficiary of funds. Over the first ten years of membership, Poland’s GDP grew
close to 49%, and its GDP per capita has grown to be 67% of the EU average. Unlike all
other EU member states, Poland avoided a recession in the fallout of the global financial
crisis in 2009. Unemployment, though still high in the 14-15% range, has fallen since EU
membership. So far, two million jobs have been created, and Poland was able to turn its
trade-deficit into a trade-surplus (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2014, 11-17).
Politically, Poland has also shown itself to be an important actor in EU politics. In
2009, the Eastern Partnership (EaP), prepared by Poland, was officially launched. The
EaP was the result of the 2004 Enlargement, as the borders of the EU moved farther east,
brining them closer to the Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia. The Central and Eastern
European countries that ascended to the EU were the driving force behind the creation of
the EaP, because of the sensitive relations between these countries and Russia, due to
their collective Communist pasts. The EaP was also a result of the failure of the EU’s
European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), which was unsuccessful in fulfilling its objectives
to the EU’s eastern neighbors. Unlike the ENP, which received its direction from the
Commission, the EaP’s initiative will come directly from the Eastern EU member states.
Poland’s place in the EaP is the fulfillment of its willingness to bring stability to Poland’s
relationship with its eastern neighbors. With the launch of the EaP, an important
cornerstone of Polish foreign policy has been implemented at the EU level (Klatt 2012,
64-81).
Another significant development was Poland’s Presidency of the European
Council in the second half of 2011. The presidency is responsible for the function of the
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upper house of the EU legislature, the Council of the European Union. The presidency
rotates to a different members state every six months. During the six-month term, the
presidency chairs meetings at every level in the Council, ensuring continuity of the EU’s
work in the Council, as well as allowing for the host nation to dictate EU agenda.
Poland’s presidency focused on economic growth and closer relations with the EU’s
eastern and southern neighbors. During Poland’s presidency, the negotiations for the
2014-2020 were started, which were a catalyst for Poland’s success in negotiation for the
largest outlay of EU budget funds (European Commission 2011; Ministry of Foreign
Affairs 2012). The Polish Presidency was viewed very favorably by both the Polish
public, with an 81.3% approval rating, and with members of the European Commission,
with a 75.5% approval rating (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2012, 184-186).
In December of 2014, former Prime Minister Donald Tusk became the second
President of the European Council. The President of the European Council is the
principal representative of the EU, and is the driving force behind the European Council,
which is compromised of the heads of state of the member states. The appointment of the
two term Prime Minister was seen by many as the culmination of Poland’s return to
Europe. As Prime Minister, Tusk oversaw much of Poland’s integration with the EU
between 2007 and 2014 (The Economist 2014). The Polish public sees the appointment
of Tusk to the presidency as greatly beneficial and a positive development in Poland’s
relation with the EU. According to a CBOS opinion poll conducted shortly after Tusks
appointment, 62% of Poles thought that the appointment of Tusk would improve the
image of Poland in Europe and in the world, 60% believed the appointment would better

40

represent Poland’s interest in the EU, and 52% believed that it would increase Poland’s
influence on EU policy (CBOS 2014a, 2).
These developments show the substantial role that the EU has played in Poland
both economically and politically, as well as the effect Poland has had on the EU. The
Polish public seems to be aware of the larger role that the EU is playing in Poland, and
overwhelmingly support for the EU in Poland is high. A CBOS poll taken at the ten-year
anniversary of EU membership showed that 89% of Poles supported Poland’s
membership in the EU, with 7% opposing it. CBOS polls on the perceived benefits of EU
membership have been consistently rising. In 2004, 39% of respondents surveyed
answered that EU membership brought more benefits than losses for Poland, and by 2014
that figure rose to 62%. The ten year anniversary poll also showed that Poles
overwhelmingly perceived the EU as a positive in terms of aiding the Polish economy,
agricultural sector, roads and infrastructure, and environmental concerns (CBOS 2014b,
1-5).
Domestic developments in Poland between 2009 and 2014 saw four elections.
The 2010 Presidential Election. President Bronislaw Komorowski, former Marshal of the
Sejm, won the election after a second round run-off vote. Komorowski had been acting
president following the death of President Lech Kaczynski in the Polish Air Force crash
in Smolensk, Russia. Komorowski ran against nine other challengers, including PiS
candidate Janusz Kaczynski2. The 2010 Presidential election brought to an end a period
of cohabitation in Poland’s political structure, as the head of state had been a member of
the opposition party in the Sejm. The presidential campaign was mostly characterized by
2

Janusz Kaczynski is the twin brother of former President Lech Kaczynski.
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fighting between the PO and PiS. Economic and left-right socio-cultural issues took
center stage. Foreign policy issues, which usually are an important facet of electoral
competition in Poland, were not as salient during this election. EU issues played an even
smaller role during the election, even with a small political controversy having taken
place in 2008. Both the president and prime minister traveled to a EU summit in October
of 2008, after disagreements between the legislature and the executive that fell on party
lines. The PO, which controlled the Sejm, felt that Prime Minister Tusk should represent
Poland at the summit, while President Kaczynski, member of the opposition party PiS,
felt that he was the rightful representative of Poland in EU matters. However, by the
campaign, this disagreement was largely forgotten, as the death of President Kaczynski
overshadowed many issues areas (Rosset 2011, 241-243).

Candidate
Bronislaw Komorowski
Jaroslaw Kaczynski
Grzegorz Napieralski
Janusz Korwin-Mikke
Waldemar Pawlak

Table 3- 2010 Presidential Election
Party
1st Round
41.54%
PO
PiS
36.46%
SLD
13.68%
WiP
2.48%
PSL
1.75%

2nd Round
53.01%
46.99%
-

National Electoral Commission- Presidential Election The Republic of Poland (2010)

The Polish Parliamentary Election of 2011 resulted with the PO remaining in
power and PiS keeping its position as the main opposition party. The 2011 election was
also significant in that it saw the return of the SLD. The SLD suffered major electoral
defeats following a litany of corruption scandals in the mid 2000s. 2011 also saw a new
party, Palikot’s Movement (PR), gain a respective number of seats. The election of PR to
the Sejm was the first time a new party had won seats in a parliamentary election since
SO in 2001. The Smolensk tragedy had divided Poland based on party lines heavily in the
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run up to the 2011 election. Some commentators referred to it as the ‘Polish-Polish War’.
PiS had painted itself as an anti-system party, with a primacy of interests during the
campaign based in cultural and social issues. The effects of the 2009 financial crisis, and
the multitude of crises in the Euro-zone did play a significant role in the campaign. This
steady stream of bad news was most detrimental to the governing PO majority in the
Sejm. PiS used the PO’s pro-European stance and attacked it. During the 2011 election,
PiS positioned itself as a more euro-skeptic party. The base of its supporters was more
religious and anti-EU integrationist. PiS radicalization ended up being its downfall.
Although the PO lost seats from the previous election, it received the largest share of
votes and was able to form a majority coalition with the PSL (Tworzecki 2012, 617-619).

Table 4- 2011 General Election Results
Party
%
Seats
Civic Platform (PO)
39.2
207
Law and Justice (PiS)
29.9
157
Palikot’s Movement (RP)
10.0
40
Polish Peasant Party (PSL)
8.4
28
Democratic Left Alliance (SLD)
8.2
27
German Minority
0.2
1
www.electionresources.org/pl/sejm.php?election=2011

The period between 2009 and 2014 also included two Elections for the EP. In the
2009 EP election, the PO won the largest share of votes and was awarded half of
Poland’s seats. PiS came in second with 15 seats, and the SLD and PSL split the
remaining seats seven to three respectively. The turnout for the 2009 elections was low,
especially when compared to the rest of the EU, with only 20.87% of eligible voters
taking part in the election (European Parliament 2014b). The 2014 European elections
were a stark contrast to the 2009 elections, both in Poland and abroad. The 2014 election
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saw a rise and a surge of support for Eurosceptic and anti-EU parties. In total, 212 of the
751 seats in the EP were awarded to Eurosceptic parties, with the largest Eurosceptic
parties winning votes in Greece, Spain, the UK, France, Denmark, and Lithuania. The
surge of support for these parties cannot simply be seen as a protest vote against
unpopular governments. Rather, the rise of these parties signaled a large contingent of the
EU electorate that is worried about the deepening of European integration. The worries
over Eastern European immigration into Western Europe, the anxieties caused by
financial crises, and voters who feel that mainstream parties don’t adequately represent
them, are all factors in the large victories for Eurosceptic parties. Although these parties
hold 28% of the seats in the EP, for now they have been effectively marginalized and are
unlikely to play a pivotal role in EU policy-making (Treib 2014, 1542-1551).
In the 2014 EP Election in Poland, 25 of the 51 MEP seats were awarded to the
PO and the SLD. PiS, which can be viewed as a soft Eurosceptic party, won 19 seats. The
real anti-EU voice came with the KNP’s victor of four seats. The PSL won the remaining
four seats (PKW 2014). Just as in 2009, the 2014 EP elections had a low turnout rate,
with only 23.83% of eligible votes casting ballots (European Parliament 2014b). Overall,
voters’ interest in EP elections are low, as illustrated by the low turnouts in both
elections. Furthermore, a CBOS poll indicated that Polish voters view the EP elections as
the least important elections in their country. Only 32% of respondents surveyed before
the 2014 election expressed any interest in voting in the upcoming election (CBOS
2014c). In addition, the Polish public also has an overwhelmingly negative opinion of the
MEPs. The CBOS found that 52% of Poles believe that the MEPs have little work to do,
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and 47% do not believe that MEPs sufficiently defend Poland’s interests in the EP
(CBOS 2014c; 2014d).

Table 5- 2009 EU Parliament Election Results
Party
%
Seats
Civic Platform (PO)
44.4
25
Law and Justice (PiS)
27.4
15
Democratic Left Alliance- Labor Union (SLD-UP) 12.3
7
Polish Peasant Party (PSL)
7.01
3
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/elections2014-results/en/mobile-country-pl-2009.html

Table 6- 2014 EU Parliament Election Results
Party
%
Seats
Civic Platform (PO)
32.1
19
Law and Justice (PiS)
31.8
19
Democratic Left Alliance- Labor Union (SLD-UP) 9.4
5
Congress of the New Right (KNP)
7.2
4
Polish Peasant Party (PSL)
6.8
4
www.eurparl.europa.eu/elections2014-results/en/country-results-pl-2014.html

With these developments and the results of the four Polish elections, the next
section will undertake an analysis of the PO, PiS, SLD, PSL, KNP, and TR. Using Robert
Ladrech’s framework, the parties studied will show whether Poland’s political parties
have been Europeanized during the second five years of Polish EU membership.
Analysis of Polish Political Parties
The Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) is the successor party of the former
communist ruling PZPR. After the dissolution of the PZPR many of its members went on
to found the Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland (SdRP), which then became the
SLD. From 1991 to 2001, the SLD was one of the strongest parties in Poland, before
corruption scandals led to political downturn in the 2005 election. In 2007, the party
entered into the Left and Democracy (LiD) grouping with several other leftist parties,
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before leaving the group in 2008. The SLD has always presented a pro-Western and proEU front, and the party was the main driver in securing EU membership. The SLD has
always supported full economic and political integration of Poland with the EU, as well
as supported a federal model of European integration (Castle and Taras 2002, 117-118;
Szczerbiak 2012, 154-156). Although scandals in the SLD led to a PiS controlled
coalition government after the 2005 Elections, the SLD remained an important player in
Poland’s EU politics. In the 2009 EP election, the SLD secured seven seats, and in 2014
it was able to keep five. In the EP, the SLD’s MEPs are grouped with the Socialists &
Democrats European Political Group.
The SLD continues to be the most pro European integration party in Poland. It’s
party program, “Tomorrow with Confidence”, is a 228-page document outline the goals
and visions of the SLD for Poland. The program covers the areas of domestic, foreign
policy, and economic affairs. The SLD provides the most comprehensive example of a
party has fully integrated itself into EU structures. Throughout the course of the
document, over 100 references are made to the EU and European integration, including a
separate twelve-page chapter dedicated to Polish-EU relations. In the realm of domestic
affairs, the SLD program calls for the advancement of Polish domestic polices, ranging
from economic to cultural and social dimensions through deeper integration with the EU.
The program contains numerous mentions of the inequality, economic and social,
between the rest of the EU and Poland (SLD 2011, 1-13). It calls for a deep integration of
the Polish budget with that of the EU, full integration of Poland into the Schengen
Agreement, and united EU-Polish immigration policy (ibid, 27-39). The SLD also
advocates for improvements in the agricultural sector through use of the Common
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Agricultural Policy (CAP) funds, the expansion and integration of rail and maritime
structures to existing EU structures, and the integration of the Polish military with the EU
and NATO (ibid, 45-72).
In the foreign policy dimensions, the SLD program calls for a three-pillared
approach for Poland. “Poland within the EU must follow a progressive model with which
it can make possible the creation of an international governance structure, with a sense of
responsibility and responsibility towards the millions of citizens of Europe” (ibid, 79-80).
The three pillar approach advocated by the SLD is that Poland be politically aligned with
Europe, secure the harmonious relations between itself and the rest of the Central and
Eastern European states, and ensure the continued participation of Poland within the
transatlantic security structures (ibid, 76). The program also calls for the immediate
ratification of the European Fundamental Rights Charter, which has so far not been
presented to the Sejm for approval.
The SLD’s link with transnational political groups within the EU is highlighted
with co-publishing of a EU party program with its EP partner, the Socialists & Democrats
and the Party of European Socialists (PES), ahead of the 2014 EP elections. This
program, entitled “In the Direction of a New Europe”, is a twelve-page document that
highlights many of the ideas found in the SLD’s 2011 program. The program calls for a
greater integration of the EU with its member states, including the strengthening of
existing EU structures. Among many other issues, the program advocates for gender
equality rights of EU workers, calls for financial institutions and reforms aimed at
improving the lives of EU citizens, calling for greater implementations of
environmentally friendly policies, and greater democracy within the EU (PES 2014, 147

12). The SLD has also held conferences with the PES, on a range of issues, such as the
PES & SLD Poland Conference on Gender Equality, held on March 7th, 2015.
The SLD has also minimally changed its party organization structures based on its
membership in the Socialist & Democrats EP Grouping. The National Board of the SLD
elects the representatives (MEPs) that will join the Socialist & Democrats in the EP, and
the SLD created the position of Delegation Coordinator for the Polish Delegation to the
Parliamentary Group of the Progressive Socialists & Democrats3. However, in terms of a
greater role for EU specialists, no roles have been created, nor has party organization
been changed on this front. The final aspect of the Ladrech framework, the effect of
European integration on inter-party competition is also not as evident when analyzing the
SLD. Following the 2005 corruption scandals, the SLD’s role in the Sejm greatly
diminished. In the 2010 Presidential Election, the SLD’s candidate, Grzegorz
Napieralski, received just shy of 14% of the vote in the first round. The SLD’s campaign
focused on social and welfare issues, but the campaign was dominated by the competition
between the PO and PiS. In the end, the SLD did not support either the PO or PiS
candidate in the second round (Rosset 2011, 241,243). During the 2011 parliamentary
elections, the SLD was able to secure only 8.2% of the vote, fiving it 27 seats in the
Sejm. The aftermath of the Smolensk crash and political fighting between the PO and PiS
once again took center stage. Many of its ‘economically left’ voters left to support PiS,
and its socially left leaning and young voters went on the support Palikot’s Movement
(PR) (Tworzecki 2011, 618-620).

3

From the SLD website- http://www.sld.org.pl/strony/5-struktura_krajowa.html
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The Polish Peasant Party (PSL) has been a relative small party in Poland, but
nevertheless an important one. The PSL has been a minority partner to the PO led
coalition government since 2007. The Polish Peasant party is another post-communist
successor party, to the United Peasant Party (ZSL), a loyal communist satellite party. The
base of the PSL’s support comes from the rural and agricultural sectors of Poland’s
population (Castle and Taras 2002, 141-143). Aleks Szczerbiak described the PSL as
having an ambivalent approach towards European integration. The PSL’s rural and
agricultural ties have always positioned the party as taking a tougher stance on EU
negotiations, in order to secure the best possible outcome for Poland’s farmers. After the
PSL joined in coalition with the PO, its stance on EU membership and integration
softened, and in many cases the party does not present any meaningful dialogue in terms
of the EU (Szczerbiak 2012, 157-158).
The PSL is a party that falls into the ‘grey area’ of party programs. Although the
PSL publishes a party program for all elections, the programs amounts to only small
variations in message from previous party programs. The PSL party program is usually
shorter than most other parties. In preparation for the 2011 elections, the party program
published by the PSL was a simple 23-page document. The program contains exactly
three mentions of the EU, two of which deal with the CAP policies and funds. The third
mention of the EU comes when the PSL discusses energy policy, stating, “the
development of renewable energy sources must be linked to Poland’s obligation with the
EU” (PSL 2011, 17). The only other mention of a transnational body is the PSL’s
commitment to Poland’s security through the continued membership of Poland in NATO
(ibid, 21-23). The rest of the program includes no mentions of the EU or European
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integration. Domestic and foreign policies are discussed in a limited fashion, and the bulk
of the program is reserved for highlighting the PSL’s continued support of Poland’s
agricultural producers. The PSL did publish party programs for the EP Elections in 2009
and 2014. The 2009 program was 24 pages long, and resolved a common theme of
recognizing the desirability of EU integration, but also striving to ensure the
“preservation of identity and of Poland” as the most important position to take in the EU
(PSL 2009, 1-2). The bulk of the 2009 program focuses on the role of the Polish
agricultural sector and the importance of CAP funds to Polish farmers. The goal of the
PSL in the EP is to support the comprehensive socio-economic development of Poland in
relation to the rest of the EU, and the leveling of difference in development (PSL 2009, 810). The PSL also states their intention of consolidating the “essential European and
Christian values”, namely the principals of “peaceful development, human and civil
rights, democracy, solidarity, justice, and the dignity of all persons” (PSL 2009, 10). The
2014 PSL EP program, at only four pages, offers some of the same themes from the 2009
program. Regional development, particularly that of Poland’s agricultural sector,
dominates the discussion in the program. In terms of European integration, the PSL
contends that it is open to further integration, but with respect to a Polish identity (PSL
2014, 1-4).
European integration has had little effect on the electoral competition of the PSL.
The PSL has had an important role in the Polish governments, having been a junior
partner in ruling coalitions from 1991 to 1997, 2001 to 2003, and from 2007 to today.
Following the 2005 elections, the PSL took a pro-European stance and has continued to
do since in subsequent years. The PSL takes a more cautious tone when discussing
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certain EU matters, such as the adoption of the Euro, generally the party favors deeper
integration with the EU. It’s position as junior coalition partner with the pro-European
PO, has also had its effects on the party’s position on the EU (Szczerbiak 2012, 155-157).
In the 2010 elections, the PSL was represented by Waldemar Pawlak, but he secured less
than 2% of the vote in the first round. During this election, as well as the legislative
election of 2011, the PSL lost substantial portions of its vote to PiS. However, both the
presidential and legislative elections showed a continued support of Poland’s rural and
agricultural vote (Rosset 2011; Tworczecki 2012).
During the first five years of EU membership, the PSL had no significant party
organizational change due to EU membership. This also continued in the years between
2009 and 2014. In 2009 the PSL was able to secure three seats in the EP and in 2014 it
secured four. The extent to which the PSL works with its EP grouping is the addition of a
link to its EP Group, the European People’s Party, a center-right Christian Democratic
party grouping.
The Civic Platform (PO) has held the presidency since 2010 and has been the
ruling the Sejm since the 2007 elections. The PO was the former party of European
Council President Donald Tusk. Throughout its history the PO has been a staunch
supporter of the EU and further EU integration, with few exceptions. Outside of its
opposition to the Constitutional Treaty and its critical stance against the Belka
government over the 2007-2013 EU budget (when it was a minority party), the PO has
been ardently pro-European. It has called for deeper integration, and has called for the
EU to be more than an agreement between states, but rather a community. Between 2004
and 2009, the PO expanded its links with its EP grouping, as well as creating links
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between like-minded political parties in Germany. It has always advocated for Polish
foreign policy to be centered around Europe, and in recent elections, it stance on Europe
has been in contrast to its main opposition party PiS (Szczerbiak 2012, 143-146).
The last party program published by the PO was for the 2011 election, as the party
has switched to dedicating its party positions on policy issues through the use of its
website. The 2011 programs is a 194-page document on various issues. Although the PO
has always been a supporter of the EU, its party program differed greatly from that of the
SLD in this regard. In the 194 pages, the EU or European integration is mentioned over
twenty-five times, but unlike the program of the SLD, the main areas the EU is addressed
is during foreign policy, environmental, security issues, and the negotiations for the
2014-2020 EU Budget. Most mentions of domestic policies that make mention of the EU,
do so in regards to how the PO would use EU funds to complete their objectives (PO
2011, 56-188). The 2011 general election was a hotly contested competition between the
PO and PiS. Because of this, the PO might have found it more prudent to focus on
domestic policies and how it deviated from the positions of PiS.
As was previously noted, the 2010 Presidential elections, and to some degree, the
2011 general elections were marred by the Smolensk tragedy that had claimed the lives of
President Kaczynski and 95 others. Early on in the 2010 campaign, public opinion
polling showed that PO’s candidate Bronislaw Komorowski and PiS’ candidate Janusz
Kaczynski were the frontrunners for the presidency. With neither side wanting to be
viewed as taking advantage of the Smolensk tragedy, the presidential campaign focused
on each candidate’s personal and presidential attributes. No substantive debates over
policy occurred, as both sides avoided strong stances. The little debate there was focused
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on economic and socio-cultural issues. EU relations and integration also played a very
minor role in the campaign. The result was a second round victory for the PO, and
Komorowski was elected president (Rosset 2011, 242-243). The 2011 general election
was a much more polarizing one than the presidential election a year earlier. PiS general
strategy was the attack the PO’s close ties with the EU and support for further integration.
In response the PO took credit for steering the countries economy away from recession,
as had been the case in most of the EU member states. The PO’s main strategy was to
convince Polish voters not to change parties amidst a global financial crisis. In the end,
PO emerged victorious gaining the most seats in the Sejm with 207, and together with he
PSL’s 27 seats was able to form a governing coalition once again (Tworczecki 2012,
618-620).
The PO’s organization changed immensely following the accession of Poland into
the EU. With these changes were also the creation of transnational links between the PO,
its EP grouping, and other parties in EU member states. First, the PO’s MEPs became
immediately active in their EP caucuses, and they were also made de facto members of
the PO’s regional and national boards. The PO also created the position of Deputy
Secretary of International Affairs, serving as a link between the PO, the MEPs, and the
PO’s sister parties in other member states (Szczerbiak 2012, 174). The PO’s 19 MEPs are
part of the European People’s Party group. The PO is also active with pan-European
Christian Democratic parties, most recently sending 57 delegates to the EPP Congress in
Dublin, Ireland4.

4

http://www.platforma.org/aktualnosc/34997/kongres-epp-w-dublinie
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The Law and Justice Party (PiS) was formed in 2001 by the Kaczynski twins.
From its founding, the parties attitude towards the EU and European integration was
more uncertain and not as well defined. PiS leadership from the very onset of EU
membership had had a distrust of the EU as an organization. For the first five years of
membership, PiS was part of the anti-federalist and Eurosceptic Union for a Europe of
Nations EP grouping. PiS has always stressed a vision of the EU as a community, with
the national sovereignty and solidarity of nations taking precedent over the EU. In other
areas, such as increasing the EU budget and CAP funds, PiS advocated for deeper
European integration (Szczerbiak 2012, 147-154). Following the 2009 EP elections, PiS
joined the European Conservatives and Reformists Grouping, which included members
of the Conservative Party in the UK, the Civic Democratic Party from the Czech
Republic, among others. This program of this group was based on the so-called Prague
Declaration. The Prague Deceleration outlines the principles of the European
Conservatives and Reformist Group, including reforming the EU based on Eurorealism,
which included a respect of national sovereignty of members tastes, importance of the
family, opposition of EU federalism, controlled immigration, and an end to wasteful and
excessive bureaucracy in the EU5. Though its EP grouping, PiS has created substantial
transnational networks among EU member states.
PiS’ party programs are always the lengthiest. The program for the 2009 EP and
2010 presidential elections was a staggering 216 pages and for the 2011 general elections
256 pages. The 2009/2010 election program made numerous references to the EU and to
European integration. The common theme throughout was that Polish sovereignty and
5

http://www.pis.org.pl/unit.php?o=pis_na_swiecie
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solidarity had to be protected above else. “The formation of external relations will be
based on realism… Polish membership in the European Union cannot mean giving up
sovereignty or violate the supremacy of the Polish Constitution” (PiS 2009, 172). All
issues areas in regards to the EU followed logically from this premise. The main theme
being that European integration was not bad, but it had to be done without compromising
Polish sovereignty. PiS also stated that democracy is only possible within the framework
of a nation-state, and that at the EU is not capable of being a true democratic institution
(PiS 2009, 68-73).
The 2011 program describes PiS as a construct of several “political trends related
to the ideas of Christian-democracy, Catholic-nationalism, and conservatism…
Invariably, Christian values shape the identity and the culture of Poland and have done so
for over a thousand years” (PiS 2011, 7). This focus on religiosity became a main feature
of PiS campaigns. During the 2011 Election especially, PiS attempted to create a clear
ideological and cultural distinction (the Polish-Polish War), between itself and the PO.
The socially and culturally far right placement of the PiS during the election ultimately
failed as a strategy, as PO remained in power (Tworzecki 2011, 619-620). The EU did
not play a significant role in the 2011 Election, and this is reflected in the party program.
In all 256 pages, the EU is mentioned only 56 times. Most mentions to the EU are the
same as in the 2009 program, with integration favored in terms of security and the EU
budget, but with the sovereignty of Poland of most importance.
The SLD, PSL, PO, and PiS are the prime political forces in Poland. These parties
have dominated the political landscape in Poland since its accession to the EU. However
there have been two new political movements of note. Palikot’s Movement (RP) founded
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in 2011 and renamed Your Movement (TR) in 2013, is a political party created by Janusz
Palikot, a former PO politician. RP’s electoral strategy was to gain the support of a wide
variety of groups that had not been represented by any previous party. PR positioned
itself as an anti-clerical party, seeking to end privileged status enjoyed by the Catholic
Church, supported feminist and LGBT causes, as well as the legalization of Marijuana.
RP was able to win 10% of the vote in 2011 Election, enough to give it 40 seats in the
Sejm, more than the SLD and PSL (Tworzecki 2012, 619-620).
During the 2014 EP Elections, TR banded with other small left leaning parties to
form the Europa Plus-Your Movement Group, but the alliance failed to get the minimum
5% threshold vote for representation and disbanded shortly after the election. The party
did publish an online program stating its party views. Overall the party can be described
as being generally pro-European (Thompson 2013, 328-329). TR maintains a three part
party program on its website entitled “Modern State, Secular State, Friendly State”,
which consist of one hundred articles defining the party’s ideology. The EU and
European integration is mentioned eight times in this document. Most notably, TR calls
for the creation of a European Federation and for the wider and deeper integration of the
Euro-zone with immediate adoption of the Euro in Poland (TR, 68-69). TR also calls for
the integration of EU standards and policies in the areas of gender and pay equality,
energy efficiency, and the adoption of the EU Fundamental Human Rights Charter (TR,
10-48). Following the failure of the Europa Plus Group to win any seats in the EP, TR
has not been active in any transnational of EP groupings.
The 2014 EP Election did show that there is a strong anti-EU presence in Poland. The
Congress of the New Right (KNP), led by Janusz Korwin-Mikke, was able to secure four
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seats to the MEP. Korwin-Mikke, who has participated in every presidential election
since 1989, is ardently anti-EU and during his campaign promised to “blow up the EU
from within” (Szczerbiak 2015). The KNP was a successor party to the equally right
wing and anti-EU Liberty and Rule of Law Party (WiP), which participated in the 2010
presidential elections with Korwin-Mikke as its candidate. The party only garnered 2.5%
of the vote in the first round. In 2015, Korwin-Mikke was expelled from the KNP and
formed yet another party, the Coalition of the Polish Republic’s Renewal Freedom and
Hope (KORWiN). Korwin-Mikke was joined by one other KNP EP, giving KORWiN
two seats on the EP. In the EP, KORWiN and all but one member of the KNP are not
attached to a EP grouping. The sole KNP member aligned with an EP grouping is part of
the Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy, a self proclaimed Eurosceptic political
grouping. KORWiN has not published any party program materials. The KNP offers a
three-part document that articulates its positions. Each part is simply on page of positions
and fundamental principles of the KNP. The KNP promises to “end the mindless
subordination to the Brussels bureaucracy” and to “restore the EU to its original
intention, as an area of free trade and free movement of people”. Further, the KNP’s
ideological declaration states “Polish sovereignty is a fundamental political value”
(KNP).

Conclusion
The above analysis examined the Europeanization effect on Poland’s political
parties using Robert Ladrech’s framework. The first part of the framework, examining
political party programs showed that there is a great deal of variation between Poland’s
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parties. The SLD seems to be the most Europeanized in this sense. Affairs from domestic
to foreign are all integrated along side EU frameworks and European integration. The
PSL, true to its agrarian and rural roots, had minimal references to the EU. Most
references to the EU were not along the lines of integration, but rather dealt with various
provisions of the EU Budget and CAP. PO, KNP, and TR showed that parties are moving
away from publishing formal electoral programs, relying on the use of their websites to
articulate their party’s positions. The PO’s 2011 party program articulates a greater
integration of EU and integration matters, but not to the extent of the SLD program. EU
issues and integration policies are primarily concentrated in the programs foreign policy,
environmental, and security issues. PiS’ numerous and lengthy party programs articulate
a theme of Polish sovereignty before furthered European integration. Though the PiS is
not anti-EU, its approach to EU issues and integration is as a Eurorealist party. It accepts
the EU as an institution and the benefits Poland receives through the various EU funds,
but it maintains the primacy of Polish sovereignty. Integration of EU matters into
domestic matters is very limited. Although the party program of the TR makes few
references to the EU, it advocates for deeper integration with calls for a European
Federation, as well as the immediate adoption of the Euro as Poland’s currency. Finally,
the short (or in the case of KORWiN non existing) party program of the KNP mainly
illustrates the party’s belief in a limited EU and a fully sovereign Poland.
In the dimension of inter-party competition, the period between 2009 and 2014
was not incredibly focused on the issues of European integration. Arguable the most proEU party in Poland, the SLD, spent much of this five-year period fighting for its political
life after years of corruption scandals marred the party. The PSL, which has enjoyed the
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position of ruling coalition partner since 2007, has not based its campaigns on EU or
integration issues. If the PSL has gone under any significant change in party competition,
it has been in softening its stance towards the EU because of its continued partnership
with the PO. The PO and PiS have dominated the political landscape in Poland since
2007. The competition between these two parties has defined the political system. In the
aftermath of the Smolensk tragedy, the 2010 and 2011 elections were predominantly free
of EU issues. The two parties focused their campaigns on domestic, socio-cultural, and
candidate issues.
In the final two dimensions of Ladrech’s framework, the effect of party
organization and the establishment of transnational links remain uneven between parties.
The PO has undergone the most significant changes in its party organization and through
the creation of links with other national parties, its EP grouping, and the incorporation of
EU specialists and its MEPs into the domestic party structure. The SLD has expanded its
links with its EP party groupings as well as with other national parties. Its party structure
has had minimal changes due to European integration. The PSL’s party organization
remains unchanged, and it has not made any considerable efforts of creating transnational
links. Although PiS has made significant links with its EP grouping and other
conservative parties across the EU, its party organization and structure remain
unchanged. The anti-EU parties, KNP and KORWiN, and the new TR, also show no
changes in party structure or the formation of transnational links.
Aleks Szczerbiak concluded that the first five years of Polish membership in the
EU had not had a significant Europeanization effect on parties. The results of this study
show that Europeanization as a result of European integration is mixed at best. The SLD
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remains the most fervent pro-EU and European integration party, and offers the best
example of a party that fulfills almost Ladrech’s entire framework of Europeanization.
The PO would be a close second to the SLD, in that it has moved its party organizational
structure and created meaningful links with its transnational partners. The main
conclusion of the application of Ladrech’s framework to Polish parties show that they
vary in how they are integrated on each dimension of the framework. PiS for example,
has built meaningful transnational ties, but has not altered its party organization and its
approach to European integration is one of extreme caution. The rise of anti-EU parties
(KNP and KORWiN), also highlight the frameworks inadequacy in examining these
parties. The parties unwillingness to create transnational links, join EP groupings, or to
publish party programs makes them hard to classify under Ladrech’s framework, even
through it could be argued that these parties have been substantially Europeanized,
although in an anti-EU direction. One other significant explanatory in why European
integration has been slow in Europeanizing Poland’s parties is the way party competition
has evolved since 2005. Since the 2005 election, Poland’s elections, both presidential and
legislative, have been centered on the competition between the PO and PiS. Though other
parties have been able to secure seats, these two political forces have dominated
campaigns. The EU as a non-issue in the 2010 and 2011 elections can be seen as a result
of this two-party competition.
The EU and European integration has certainly become a dimension of political
competition in Poland. Each party has a clear position on the issue, but most European
issues in Poland have been overshadowed. The most salient EU issues regardless of party
have been that of the EU budget and security concerns. Budgetary and security issues are
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the most well integrated into the platforms of each party. Outside of these two areas, EU
issues have not become a realigning or even central feature of the political system in
Poland. Although parties have incorporated various EU policies and structures into their
organization in various ways, it is not enough to conclude that Polish parties have been
Europeanized.
More research will have to be done in Poland, and in other member states.
For future research, Ladrech’s framework of Europeanization must be amended to better
understand how European integration has affected political parties in member states.
Although Ladrech’s framework presents viable dimensions for research, it must be
changed to more accurately reflect the process of Europeanization of political parties.
One important addition to the aspect of Europeanization of political parties must be
added to better reflect the dynamic between parties and their roles in democracies.
Samuel Eldersveld outlined six crucial roles that parties play in democracies. These party
functions include “(1) control and recruitment of elites, (2) interest aggregation, (3)
conflict management, (4) competition maximization, (5) policy innovation, and (6)
socializing citizens to a system consensus” (Yesilada 2002, 125). The sixth role, that of
the party’s function in socializing citizens to a system consensus, would be key in further
understanding the Europeanization effect on political parties. Within the confides of
Ladrech’s framework, it would be difficult to extrapolate this link. The evidence provided
in this study focused on the ways in which the EU and European integration had a distinct
effect on political parties in Poland through changes in party structure and organization,
the salience of EU issues in party programs, inter-party competition, and ties between
transnational parties and EP groupings. The processes identified by Ladrech focus on
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these narrow categories. Further research will have to include a discussion and research
on if, and how, parties are socializing their citizens to a consensus on issues of European
integration.
This study is a stepping-stone to greater understanding of political party behavior
in relation to EU membership. Robert Ladrech’s framework allows for a structural
understanding of Europeanization, but it leaves questions unanswered. Mainly, issues of
how parties socialize their constituents to EU membership and integration remain
unclear. Researching only one EU member state also does not provide a full
comprehensive understanding of the issue of Europeanization. Though Poland has always
been a willing partner in the EU project and its citizens overwhelmingly support EU
membership, Poland is unique in that it is a relatively recent member, and differs from
other EU members. The EU consists of over 500 million citizens in 28 member states.
Although the EU has been most important to member states in economic and security
realms, the EU also strives to become an important social actor. The objectives of the EU
include goals of establishing European citizenship, ensure freedom and justice, and
promote social progress. The social aspects of the EU also further expand the definition
of Europeanization by introducing the question of what EU citizenship and social
progress mean. Adding dimensions of European values and ideals will undoubtedly
create a different meaning of Europeanization and how it effects domestic politics of
member states. By employing Ladrech’s framework and building upon the work of Aleks
Szczerbiak, Europeanization of Poland’s political parties yields limited and mixed results.
Further research and study will hopefully make issues of Europeanization clearer and
illustrate how the EU changes the politics of its member states.
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Appendix A- Election Results 2001-2014

Sejm Election Results, Prime Ministers, and Coalition Governments
2001-2014
Party
Democratic Left Alliance (SLD)
Civic Platform (PO)
Self Defense (SO)
Law and Justice (PiS)
Polish Peasants Party (PSL)
League of Polish Families (LPR)
German Minority
Law and Justice (PiS)
Civic Platform (PO)
Self Defense (SO)
Democratic Left Alliance (SLD)
League of Polish Families (LPR)
Polish Peasants Party (PSL)
German Minority
Civic Platform (PO)
Law and Justice (PiS)
Left and Democracy (LiD)
Polish Peasants Party (PSL)
German Minority
Civic Platform (PO)
Law and Justice (PiS)
Palikot’s Movement (RP)
Polish Peasants Party (PSL)
Democratic Left Alliance (SLD)
German Minority

Seats
Prime Minister
2001 Elections
216
Leszek Miller (01-04)
65
53
44
42
Marek Belka (04-05)
38
2
2005 Election
155
Kazimeriz Marinkiewicz
133
(05-06)
56
55
34
Jaroslaw Kaczynski (06-07)
25
2
2007 Election
209
Donald Tusk
166
53
31
1
2011 Election
207
Donald Tusk (09-14)
157
40
28
Ewa Kopacz (14-present)
27
1

www.electionresources.org/pl/sejm.php
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Coalition
SLD-UP-PSL

SLD-UP

PiS-SO-LPR

PO-PSL

PO-PSL

PO-PSL

